I recently noticed a Twitlonger post by a philosophy student that I am sure you will agree it is more than worthy of a reprint:
It is often said that 'morality is real' (i.e., some moral claims are true) only if there is a god or gods to make these moral claims true. I am not sure why anyone would still believe this. But I thought that I ought to rehearse a few (extremely old) arguments about the matter. I take credit for none of the core arguments that I'm about to present. (In particular, I direct people to Plato and TM Scanlon.)
So it is said that moral claims -- of the form 'You are morally obligated to X' or 'Morality requires you to X' -- are true only if there is a god to ground such claims. As Plato raised (regarding the matter of piety) in his "Gorgias", it is doubtful that a god could play such a role. Consider some putative commandment of a god that we humans X (i.e., do not kill, or whatever). We must ask: Why has the god commanded that we X, and what role does the god's commandment play in the generation of our obligation to X.
Two options present themselves. Either the god has commanded us to X because our X-ing is obligatory on independent grounds, or our X-ing becomes obligatory because the god has commanded us to X.
The first option makes god redundant. If our X-ing is obligatory on independent grounds, then the god is playing no role in the generation of our obligation and the truth/objectivity of the moral claim in question.
The second option makes morality's foundation arbitrary. If we are obligated to X simply because the god says so, and there is no independent explanation of why we ought to X, then morality loses its force. How could we possibly be required to do something *simply* because a being has told us to do so for no reason. (Remember: if he has told us to X for a reason, e.g., because it is independently good or required that we X, then god becomes redundant.)
Most people who wish to believe that god grounds moral claims realize that the first option immediately undermines their position. So, when presented with this problem, they attempt to deal with the second option, by explaining why a god's demand that we X may have force for us, despite the fact that her/his demand is arbitrary. For example, they suggest that we have an incentive to X, because if we do not X (i.e., if we flout god's commandments), then we will be punished by god. Of course, this is a ridiculous idea. If the ultimate explanation of my obligation to X (e.g., my obligation not to torture others, my obligation not to steal your children, and so on) is that my failure to X will result in punishment, then we are no longer talking about moral obligation. Such an account leaves us without any explanation of why it is *wrong* to flout one's moral obligations; instead, acting immorally is simply imprudent from a purely self-interested perspective. And recall that on this account god's punishing us is entirely arbitrary, because his commandment was arbitrary in the first place. This models god as an abusive bully who pushes us around and punishes us for no reason (literally).
In an attempt to get away from this problem, some people claim that it is true that a god's demand that we X is what obligates us to X, but they say explain that god is a loving being who issues commandments to us because she/he loves us. But this, by itself, cannot help. If what this means is that the god in question tells us to X because our X-ing is good for us, in humanity's interests, or whatever, then this is actually just a version of taking the first option. And recall that the first option leaves god as redundant. If X-ing is something that I ought to do irrespective of the god's commandment, then the god is playing no role in the generation of the moral obligation. Alternatively, if there is no sense in which I ought to X independently of the loving god's commandment, then it is unclear why his commanding me to X could be a matter of his loving me. (In other words, if there is no independent reason for me to X, then why would someone who loves me demand that I X?)
This brings us back to square one. The result is that there is no role that god could play in generating moral obligations and grounding the truth/objectivity of moral claims. If a god tells us to act in certain ways because we have good independent reason to act in those ways, then god is redundant. And if god tells us to act in certain ways without any reason at all, then these putative moral demands are utterly arbitrary.
Not only is a god not required to ground moral claims, but there is no way that a god *could* ground moral claims. [my emphasis]
Saturday, January 30, 2010
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12 comments:
"If a god tells us to act in certain ways because we have good independent reason to act in those ways, then god is redundant."
I believe the argument is that God is telling us to act in certain ways because *He* has good independent reason to act in those ways, not that *we* have those good independent reasons. Once we figure those reasons out, *then* God becomes redundant (and we aren't there yet.)
With great respect to the author, I see a logical flaw in the analysis. "If God tells us to X for a reason, then God becomes redundant".
That makes no sense. Where A tells B to do something because, for example, it will prolong B's life, then A is not redundant. A, in fact, is the exact opposite of being redundant; A is necessary. A is necessary because, presumably, B would otherwise not do X without being told to do so by A (notwithstanding that it may be obvious to others that X is a wise thing to do).
Perhaps the confusion lies in the word "redundant". That word is often misused.
CKDC, to address your example, the prolongation of life is caused by the fact that the suggestion had a positive consequence, not because A [suggested to be lordy] suggested it. In other words, if lordy suggests moving to a low cal diet, that will likely increase health expectancy because a low cal diet has that effect. But lordy could just as easily turn around and say that B should eat poutine for breakfast, lunch and dinner which likely won't increase longevity. Lordy is redundant, however you want to define redundant, because the life extender/diminisher is separate and apart from him/her/it.
Why do you refuse to answer my questions?
"It (morality based solely in an individual's opinion) functions in a free and democratic society by majority rule..."
A. Please give me an example of a truly democratic society.
B. Early United States, the majority of people have zero qualms with
C.The majority of people in the United States now believe that abortion is wrong. Making it now immoral in the US, right?
D. The vast majority of people have the opinion that it is perfectly okay to kill animals, yet you do not "believe" that is moral.
E. What are the boundaries of your "morality?" Can one country deem slavery moral by majority, and the neighboring country deem it immoral by majority? Or does it have to be a universal majority? What about in a small community? If the majority of people on a high-school football tram decide that it is moral to beat the crap out of the opposing minority, is that okay?
It seems to me that something is morally correct only if you agree with it.
Paul, my answer to your questions are as follows:
A. I know of no such utopia.
B. Typo so I can't make out your question.
C. If your stated premise is true (which I doubt), I would agree with your proposition.
D. That's right. I believe it is immoral to consume nonhuman animals when it is practical and possible to avoid doing so.
E. The boundaries of my morality is my evolved senses of reason, decency and fairness. Of course neighbouring countries can have differing standards of morality. Country A will allow 14 year old girls to marry while Country B will not allow that until girls are 18. In one country, sex with a 15 year old is right while in another it is wrong. Why do you find this so strange?
Yes, moral behavior is whatever we decide it is going to be. Morality is a human construct - just like your god.
Sorry, question B was "Early United States, the majority of people have zero qualms with slavery, so was it moral?"
As of 2009, the majority of Americans are "pro-life" rather than "pro-choice," says Gallup. http://www.gallup.com/poll/118399/more-americans-pro-life-than-pro-choice-first-time.aspx So does that make abortion immoral in the US?
If the vast majority of people(there has not been a study that I know of, so I am making an assumption) believe that killing animals is perfectly moral, and you believe that it is immoral, who is right?
"Moral behavior is whatever we decide it is going to be." Who is we? You? The Prime Minister? The UN? The "majority?" I again go back to slavery. If "we" decide what is and is not moral, please tell me why slavery was immoral in the US. That is, unless you don't believe it was immoral.
Paul, first of all, slavery is always immoral from the perspective of the enslaved (i.e. they don't like it) whether it be black slaves on cotton plantations, jewish slaves in concentration camps or animal slaves in dairy/poultry factory farms. Enslaving humans was considered perfectly acceptable by most societies for probably 1700 years until emancipation movements sprouted after the Age of the Enlightenment. Many of those slave owners were Christians and they didn't consider their actions to be immoral. By the way, I love this quote by Joseph McCabe: "No Pope ever condemned slavery".
I also love this excerpt from the papal Bull of Nicholas V (1455):
We [therefore] weighing all and singular the premises with due meditation, and noting that since we had formerly by other letters of ours granted among other things free and ample faculty to the aforesaid King Alfonso -- to invade, search out, capture, vanquish, and subdue all Saracens and pagans whatsoever, and other enemies of Christ wheresoever placed, and the kingdoms, dukedoms, principalities, dominions, possessions, and all movable and immovable goods whatsoever held and possessed by them and to reduce their persons to perpetual slavery, and to apply and appropriate to himself and his successors the kingdoms, dukedoms, counties, principalities, dominions, possessions, and goods, and to convert them to his and their use and profit;" [my emphasis]
So, your Pope thought slavery was just tickety-boo when it suited his purposes 555 years ago. Do you consider his pronouncement to be immoral? Please explain.
I like your example of killing nonhuman animals because the parallels to human slavery are striking. You are correct that most people currently have no qualms about killing animals (for the most trivial reasons, I might add). I consider it to be immoral for me to consume a nonhuman animal if it is practical and possible to avoid doing so. However, while I might try to persuade others to accept my moral position and reduce the terrible amount of animal suffering, I do not seek to IMPOSE my moral beliefs on others. You see, no one can really impose a moral obligation on you - it is a self-policing concept. I don't cheat on my wife because I don't want to (based on a combination of genetic and environmental factors) despite the fact that I could certainly be tempted to do so. My "decision" not to cheat (which, as you know, I do not really consider a true decision because I believe free will is a mirage) is one I arrive at on my own, regardless of what some mythic religious book tells me what to do.
You can't legislate morality. You can outlaw abortion, slavery, adultery and consuming nonhuman animals and it is all still going to happen. I don't favour any of these practices based on the fact that they are "immoral to me" (not in an absolute sense*) but, as noted above, I don't force my morality on others and I do not expect any karmic consequences to arise from any of these practices.
*When I say not in an absolute sense, I mean that I can come up with hypothetical factual circumstances that would require me to commit one of the acts that I currently try to avoid. For example, I would consume a nonhuman animal product if it was necessary to save my own life. But that doesn't make the consumption any more palatable for the nonhuman animal I consume.
I should add that society as a whole often imposes its moral choices on us, such as outlawing slavery and, in some cases, outlawing abortion. I agree with the former but not the latter. As an atheist, I oppose society imposing moral rules on me based on religious rules. I want moral rules to be based on reason. I consider it to be rational not to enslave humans because they have inherent rights not to be enslaved. I apply the same reasoning to nonhuman animals. In my opinion, speciesim is just as rationally indefensible (i.e. "immoral" to me) as racism and sexism.
"I don't force my morality on others."
You believe that slavery is wrong, should that be forced on others?
"I consider it to be rational not to enslave humans because they have inherent rights not to be enslaved." Who, or what, gives us this inherent right? Does society give us this inherent right? Or do we just have this inherent right? If we just have the inherent right not to be enslaved, do we have other inherent rights that just are? Who dictates what these inherent rights are? Do we have the inherent right to X amount of paid vacation does like the UN says? When does an inherent right begin?
I love questions and answers:
You believe that slavery is wrong, should that be forced on others?. Yes, for at least three reasons: 1. I don't want to be enslaved; 2. Because I don't want to be enslaved, I don't believe others should be enslaved (i.e. The Golden Rule appeals to me); and 3. Slavery is economically inefficient. That being said, some would argue that a capitalist economic system is nothing more than slavery. I don't agree with that view but it is intresting.
Who, or what, gives us this inherent right [not to be enslaved]? Nobody gives us the right. Morality is an individualized concept that we each apply to human actions. Each of us decides for ourselves whether we think the right to be enslaved is something worth protecting and, if enough of us agree on that, our societies will enact laws which our consistent with that consensus. It's really quite simple.
So human slavery is wrong because we have the inherent right not to be enslaved. This inherent right comes from the majority individual concepts or just one individual concept? If majority is the answer, was slavery immoral back in 1600? If one individual is the answer, what makes your concept better than somebody who has a pro-slavery concept?
Paul, slavery was perfectly acceptable (i.e. "moral") to those who kept slaves in 1600 and, I should add, Nicholas V obviously saw nothing wrong with it when he wrote the papal Bull referred to above. It's funny how you ignore what you don't want to respond to.
My "concept" is that we make up our own morality as influenced by genetic and environmental factors. One of those environmental factors are societal norms but, as you know, there are some who reject societal norms. My concept is entirely consistent with pro-slavery and anti-slavery depending on who is making the decision, where and when. All I mean by saying slavery is inherently wrong (i.e. bad) is that those who are enslaved would always agree that being enslaved is bad. In much the same way as animals (if they could talk) would always prefer not to be eaten.
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