I recently noticed a Twitlonger post by a philosophy student that I am sure you will agree it is more than worthy of a reprint:
It is often said that 'morality is real' (i.e., some moral claims are true) only if there is a god or gods to make these moral claims true. I am not sure why anyone would still believe this. But I thought that I ought to rehearse a few (extremely old) arguments about the matter. I take credit for none of the core arguments that I'm about to present. (In particular, I direct people to Plato and TM Scanlon.)
So it is said that moral claims -- of the form 'You are morally obligated to X' or 'Morality requires you to X' -- are true only if there is a god to ground such claims. As Plato raised (regarding the matter of piety) in his "Gorgias", it is doubtful that a god could play such a role. Consider some putative commandment of a god that we humans X (i.e., do not kill, or whatever). We must ask: Why has the god commanded that we X, and what role does the god's commandment play in the generation of our obligation to X.
Two options present themselves. Either the god has commanded us to X because our X-ing is obligatory on independent grounds, or our X-ing becomes obligatory because the god has commanded us to X.
The first option makes god redundant. If our X-ing is obligatory on independent grounds, then the god is playing no role in the generation of our obligation and the truth/objectivity of the moral claim in question.
The second option makes morality's foundation arbitrary. If we are obligated to X simply because the god says so, and there is no independent explanation of why we ought to X, then morality loses its force. How could we possibly be required to do something *simply* because a being has told us to do so for no reason. (Remember: if he has told us to X for a reason, e.g., because it is independently good or required that we X, then god becomes redundant.)
Most people who wish to believe that god grounds moral claims realize that the first option immediately undermines their position. So, when presented with this problem, they attempt to deal with the second option, by explaining why a god's demand that we X may have force for us, despite the fact that her/his demand is arbitrary. For example, they suggest that we have an incentive to X, because if we do not X (i.e., if we flout god's commandments), then we will be punished by god. Of course, this is a ridiculous idea. If the ultimate explanation of my obligation to X (e.g., my obligation not to torture others, my obligation not to steal your children, and so on) is that my failure to X will result in punishment, then we are no longer talking about moral obligation. Such an account leaves us without any explanation of why it is *wrong* to flout one's moral obligations; instead, acting immorally is simply imprudent from a purely self-interested perspective. And recall that on this account god's punishing us is entirely arbitrary, because his commandment was arbitrary in the first place. This models god as an abusive bully who pushes us around and punishes us for no reason (literally).
In an attempt to get away from this problem, some people claim that it is true that a god's demand that we X is what obligates us to X, but they say explain that god is a loving being who issues commandments to us because she/he loves us. But this, by itself, cannot help. If what this means is that the god in question tells us to X because our X-ing is good for us, in humanity's interests, or whatever, then this is actually just a version of taking the first option. And recall that the first option leaves god as redundant. If X-ing is something that I ought to do irrespective of the god's commandment, then the god is playing no role in the generation of the moral obligation. Alternatively, if there is no sense in which I ought to X independently of the loving god's commandment, then it is unclear why his commanding me to X could be a matter of his loving me. (In other words, if there is no independent reason for me to X, then why would someone who loves me demand that I X?)
This brings us back to square one. The result is that there is no role that god could play in generating moral obligations and grounding the truth/objectivity of moral claims. If a god tells us to act in certain ways because we have good independent reason to act in those ways, then god is redundant. And if god tells us to act in certain ways without any reason at all, then these putative moral demands are utterly arbitrary.
Not only is a god not required to ground moral claims, but there is no way that a god *could* ground moral claims. [my emphasis]
Saturday, January 30, 2010
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